Two groups of agents, G 1 and G 2 , face a moral conflict if G 1 has a moral obligation and G 2 has a moral obligation, such that these obligations cannot both be fulfilled. We study moral conflicts using a multi-agent deontic logic devised to represent reasoning about sentences like 'In the interest of group F of agents, group G of agents ought to see to it that φ'. We provide a formal language and a consequentialist semantics. An illustration of our semantics with an analysis of the Prisoner's Dilemma follows. Next, necessary and sufficient conditions are given for (1) the possibility that a single group of agents faces a moral conflict, for (2) the possibility that two groups of agents face a moral conflict within a single moral code, and for (3) the possibility that two groups of agents face a moral conflict.
Introduction
Moral conflicts, their existence, and the conditions for their existence are among the divisive elements in meta-ethics. In the philosophical literature, moral conflicts are usually studied from the standpoint of a single agent. 1 From such a single-agent point of view, an agent faces a moral conflict if the agent has two moral obligations that cannot both be fulfilled. By raising the study of moral conflicts from a singleagent to a multi-agent perspective, we generalize the concept of moral conflict: two groups of agents, G 1 and G 2 , face a moral conflict if G 1 has a moral obligation and G 2 has a moral obligation, such that these obligations cannot both be fulfilled. (If the two groups are identical and consist of a single agent, the moral conflict boils down to a single-agent moral conflict in the usual sense.) Given two moral obligations, one may ask whether these obligations stem from the same moral code or not. In Sophocles's Antigone, Creon's obligation not to bury the traitor Polynices stems from the civic values of the city he represents, whereas Antigone's obligation to bury her brother Polynices stems from religious and family values. For reasons of uniformity, we shall confine our present investigation to moral codes that can be formulated in a consequentialist fashion. More specifically, each group F of agents defines a moral code stipulating that F's collective interest is to be maximized. Accordingly, the group of all agents defines the moral code of utilitarianism: an agent has a certain utilitarian obligation if this obligation stems from the moral code that the collective interest of the group of all agents is to be maximized. Moreover, an agent only accepting the moral code defined by himself is an ethical egoist, who is to maximize his own self-interest. Henceforth, a moral obligation is indexed by two groups of agents, G and F. G indicates the group who has the obligation. F refers to the interest group who defines the consequentialist moral code from which the obligation stems.
Fulfilling a moral obligation involves doing what one ought to do. Hence, J.L. Austin hit the mark with his suggestion that "before we consider what actions are good or bad, right or wrong, it is proper to consider first what is meant by, and what not, (..) the expression 'doing an action' or 'doing something'" (Austin 1957, p. 178) . 2 In our logical analysis of moral conflicts between groups of agents, we adopt Austin's suggestion. On the basis of the well established stit logics of agency developed by Nuel Belnap and others (Belnap, Perloff, & Xu 2001) , we present a consequentialist system of multi-agent deontic logic, which is a generalization of John Horty's utilitarian deontic logic (Horty 2001) . By means of our consequentialist deontic logic, we investigate the logical interaction between (1) alethic statements having the form 'It is possible that φ' (abbreviated as ♦φ), (2) agentive statements having the form 'Group G of agents sees to it that φ' (abbreviated as [G] φ), and (3) deontic statements having the form 'In the interest of group F of agents, group G of agents ought to see to it that φ' (abbreviated as ⊙ F G φ). This language enables us to give a formal definition of moral conflicts. Two groups of agents, G 1 and G 2 , face a moral conflict if and only if there are formulas φ and ψ, such that both ⊙
ψ are true, whereas ♦(φ ∧ ψ) is false. Note that if φ and ψ cannot both be true, the truth of ψ implies the falsity of φ and, hence, having a moral obligation to see to it that ψ implies having a moral obligation to see to it that ¬φ. Therefore, any moral conflict between G 1 and G 2 implies a basic moral conflict between those groups: two groups of agents, G 1 and G 2 , face a basic moral conflict if and only if there is a formula φ, such that both ⊙
In the same vein G.H. von Wright deems a logic of action a necessary requirement for deontic logic. See (von Wright 1963, p. vii) and (von Wright 1966, p. 134). are true. (Obviously, non-existence of basic moral conflicts implies non-existence of moral conflicts tout court. 3 ) Thus, formulas of the form
will be central to our current investigation.
As a useful leg up to our formal results concerning moral conflicts between groups of agents, we illustrate our deontic logic with a formal analysis of the Prisoner's Dilemma. We shall show that the game theoretic dilemma can be completely translated into our model theory and that our semantics rules that each prisoner ought to confess in his own interest, but also that each prisoner ought not to confess in the collective interest of both prisoners: hence, each prisoner faces a basic moral conflict. Roughly, we shall show that a single group of agents may face a basic moral conflict if and only if the pertinent obligations stem from different moral codes. Or equivalently, a single group of agents cannot face a basic moral conflict if and only if the pertinent obligations stem from a single moral code. How about two groups? Might two groups of agents face a moral conflict of which the pertinent obligations stem from a single moral code?
Standard deontic logic entirely rules out such moral conflicts. The non-existence of moral conflicts within a single moral code is ensured by the joint validity of the principles Oφ → ♦φ ('ought' implies 'can') and (Oφ∧Oψ) → O(φ∧ψ) (deontic agglomeration). 4 In our logic, the translates of these principles are the following:
Both principles are valid according to our semantics. Nevertheless, their validity does not preclude the possibility of moral conflicts within a single moral code. 5 Roughly, we shall show that two groups of agents may face a basic moral conflict of which the pertinent obligations stem from a single moral code if and only if the 3 Compare (Goble 2005, pp. 462-463) . 4 The proof is straightforward and familiar: suppose that Oφ and O¬φ are simultaneously true. Then, by deontic agglomeration and modus ponens, it must be that O(φ ∧ ¬φ). Hence, by 'ought' implies 'can' and modus ponens, it must be that ♦(φ ∧ ¬φ), which is absurd.
To clear the way for moral dilemmas in deontic logic, E.J. Lemmon proposes to reject the principle that 'ought' implies 'can' (see (Lemmon 1962, p. 150, n. 8) and (Lemmon 1965, pp. 47-50) ), whereas Bas van Fraassen and Bernard Williams suggest to dismiss the principle of deontic agglomeration (see (van Fraassen 1973, p. 15) and (Williams 1973, p. 181-182) ). For a recent discussion of moral conflicts in standard deontic logic, see (Goble 2005) .
5 " [T] he existence of single-agent dilemmas forces us to give up either the principle that 'ought' implies 'can' or the [agglomeration] principle of deontic logic; but the reality of interpersonal moral conflicts forces no such concessions" (McConnell 1988, p. 32). two groups have at least one common member and neither of the two groups is a subgroup of the other.
The set-up of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we fix a formal language for our multi-agent deontic logic and provide a consequentialist semantics for it. We illustrate our semantics in Section 2.5.2 with an instance of the Prisoner's Dilemma. In Section 3.1 we give a formal characterization of the possibility that a single group of agents faces a basic moral conflict. In Section 3.2 we formally characterize the possibility that two groups of agents face a basic moral conflict stemming from a single moral code. These two formal characterizations are combined in Section 3.3 to obtain a formal characterization of the possibility that two groups of agents face a moral conflict. We conclude the paper with a short discussion of our results.
Language and Semantics

Language
Throughout the paper, we use a propositional modal language L built from a countable set P = {p 1 , p 2 , . . .} of atomic propositions and a finite set A = {a 1 , . . . , a n } of individual agents. L is the smallest set (in terms of set-theoretical inclusion) satisfying the conditions (i) through (v):
We leave out brackets and braces if the omission does not give rise to ambiguities.
This formal language enables us to formalize a rather broad class of moral obligations, because there is no necessary connection between the group G who has a certain obligation and the group F who defines the moral code from which the obligation stems. Two examples: a utilitarian obligation like 'In the interest of all agents, group G of agents ought to see to it that φ' can now be formalized as ⊙ A G φ, since A denotes the group of all agents. An egoistic obligation like 'In his own interest, the agent a ought to see to it that φ' can be rendered as ⊙ a a φ. We shall evaluate formulas of the language L in consequentialist models.
Consequentialist Models
Definition 1 A consequentialist model M is an ordered pair S, I , where S is a choice structure and I an interpretation.
Choice structures are defined over a non-empty set W of possible worlds and a finite set A of agents. Interpretations assign agent-relative utilities to possible worlds and world-relative truth-values to atomic propositions.
For clarity's sake we do not take up Horty's branching-time models to evaluate deontic formulas. Instead, we here adopt a rather standard possible worlds approach. 7 Hence, our models represent possibilities, group actions, and group obligations at a single moment in time.
Choice Structures
Definition 2 A choice structure S is a triple W, A, Choice , where W is a nonempty set of possible worlds, A a finite set of agents, and Choice a choice function.
Choice functions
Given a non-empty set W of possible worlds and a finite set A of individual agents, we define choice sets of individual agents by a choice function from individual agents to sets of sets of possible worlds, i.e., Choice : A → ℘(℘(W )), meeting the conditions that (1) for each individual agent a in A it holds that Choice(a) is a partition of W , and (2) for each selection function s assigning to each individual agent a in A a set of possible worlds s(a) such that s(a) ∈ Choice(a) it holds that a∈A s(a) is non-empty. 8 For example, let W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 } and A = {a, b}. Define Choice(a) = {{w 1 , w 2 }, {w 3 , w 4 }} and Choice(b) = {{w 1 , w 3 }, {w 2 , w 4 }}. Then Choice is a choice function, since it meets the two conditions: (1) both Choice(a) and Choice(b) are partitions of W , and (2) for each of the four selection functions s assigning to agent a an option s(a) in Choice(a) and to agent b an option
7 Definitions of branching-time models for stit logics can be found in (Belnap, Perloff, & Xu 2001) and (Horty 2001) . 8 The latter requirement is the condition of agent independence. It ensures that there is a possible world in which each individual agent performs the action of his choice, regardless of the courses of action adopted by all other individual agents. Hence, Choice is defined so that at a single moment in time no individual agent can prevent any other individual agent from performing an action. See, for instance, (Belnap, Perloff, & Xu 2001, pp. 217-218 and p. 283) , and (Horty 2001, pp. 30-31) . 9 The four selection functions are s1, s2, s3, and s4, where s1(a) = {w1, w2}, s1(b) = {w1, w3}; s2(a) = {w1, w2}, s2(b) = {w2, w4}; s3(a) = {w3, w4}, s3(b) = {w1, w3}; and Choice sets for groups of agents are given by a choice function from sets of individual agents to sets of sets of possible worlds, i.e., Choice : ℘(A) → ℘(℘(W )). Just like Horty does, we define group choices in terms of individual choices, thereby giving an affirmative answer to von Wright's question "whether acts attributed to collective agents could not be regarded as 'logical constructions' of acts of some individual agents" (von Wright 1963, pp. 38-39) . To be precise, given a choice function Choice from individual agents to sets of sets of possible worlds and given the corresponding set Select of selection functions s assigning to each individual agent a in A an option s(a) in Choice(a), we define
if G is non-empty. Otherwise, Choice(G) = {W }. Thus, in our present example, Choice({a, b}) = {{w 1 }, {w 2 }, {w 3 }, {w 4 }}. 10 The proof of our theorem on moral conflicts within a single moral code (Section 3.2) makes use of some facts concerning choice functions:
10 Given the four selection functions of footnote 9, it holds that
by elementary set theory.
G-choice equivalence of worlds
In choosing an option K from Choice(G), the group G of agents restricts the total set of possible worlds to the possible worlds in the set K. A formula of the form [G]φ, informally interpreted as 'Group G of agents sees to it that φ', is true in a world w if and only if φ is true in all possible worlds that are elements of the option of G that contains w. Or, equivalently, if and only if for all possible worlds w ′ that are G-choice equivalent to world w it holds that φ is true in world w ′ . G-choice equivalence is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (G-Choice Equivalence) Let S(= W, A, Choice ) be a choice structure. Let G ⊆ A. Let w, w ′ ∈ W . Then w ∼ G w ′ (w and w ′ are G-choice equivalent) is defined to be:
Thus, in our previous example, it holds that w 1 ∼ a w 2 and that w 1 ∼ b w 2 . After this discussion of choice structures, we must define their interpretations.
Interpretations
Definition 4 An interpretation I is an ordered pair Utility, V , where Utility is a utility function and V a valuation function.
Utility functions
The relation between individual utilities and group utilities is a subject bristling with pitfalls. Without taking a definite stance on this issue, we adopt, for the sake of the argument, John Harsanyi's proposal and conceive of group utility as the arithmetical mean of the individual utilities of the agents involved. 11 Obviously, the arithmetical mean of individual utilities can only be given a clear meaning if we can make interagential comparisons of individual utilities. To make possible such comparisons, we here start from the assumption that all individual utilities are normalized and that they are given by a utility function from ordered pairs consisting of an individual agent and a possible world to the real numbers between, say, −5 and 5, i.e., Utility : A × W → [−5, 5]. Thus, if an individual agent a assigns to a possible world w a utility of 4, we write Utility(a, w) = 4. Group utilities are given by a utility function from ordered pairs consisting of a set of individual agents and a possible world to real numbers between −5 and 5, i.e., Utility : ℘(A)×W → [−5, 5]. We define group utilities in terms of individual utilities, assuming that (1) in assessing the group utility of a given possible world, the individual utilities that are assigned to that world by the individual agents in the group are to be weighed equally, and (2) group utilities of groups of different sizes are to be comparable. Hence, the group utility a group F of agents assigns to a possible world w is defined as the arithmetical mean of the individual utilities the individual agents in F assign to w:
if F is non-empty. Otherwise, Utility(F, w) = 0. Thus, if Utility(a, w) = 4 and Utility(b, w) = 0, then Utility({a, b}, w) = 2.
Valuation functions
Valuations are given by a valuation function from ordered pairs consisting of an atomic proposition and a possible world to the truth-values TRUE and FALSE, i.e., V : P × W → {TRUE, FALSE}, where TRUE = FALSE. Thus, if an atomic proposition p is true in a possible world w, we write V (p, w) = TRUE.
F-dominance between G's options
Roughly, a formula of the form ⊙ F G φ, informally interpreted as 'In the interest of group F of agents, group G of agents ought to see to it that φ', is true in a world w if and only if for all options K in Choice(G) that do not ensure that φ there is a strictly F-better option K ′ in Choice(G) such that (1) option K ′ ensures φ, and (2) all options K ′′ that are at least as F-good as K ′ also ensure φ. Following (Horty 1996) and (Horty 2001) , we interpret "F-betterness" decision-theoretically and define it as F-dominance. Our relation of F-dominance is a generalization of Horty's dominance relation. 12 When a group G performs a collective action by choosing an option K from Choice(G), it constrains the set W of possible worlds to that set K of possible worlds. It may be, however, that the agents who are not members of G (and who therefore are members of the group A − G) perform a collective action by choosing an option S from Choice(A − G), thereby constraining the set K to the non-empty set of possible worlds K ∩ S. (Note that the condition of agent independence ensures that K ∩S is non-empty.) Hence, G usually will not be able to fully determine the outcome of its collective actions, since the final outcome also depends on the actions of agents in A − G. Nevertheless, we can define an F-dominance relation, denoted by F G , over G's options. If K and K ′ both are in Choice(G), then, intuitively, K F G K ′ is true if and only if K promotes the utility of group F at least as well as K ′ , regardless of the collective action of the agents in A − G. Hence, we insert an interest group F in Horty's Definitions 4.1 and 4.5 (Horty 2001, p. 60 and p. 68) to define F-dominance:
Definition 5 (F -Dominance) Let M(= S, I ) be a consequentialist model. Let F, G ⊆ A and let K, K ′ ∈ Choice(G). Then K F G K ′ (K weakly F-dominates K ′ for G) is defined to be:
and for all w, w ′ ∈ W it holds that if w ∈ K ∩ S and w ′ ∈ K ′ ∩ S, then Utility(F, w) ≥ Utility(F, w ′ ).
The proof of our theorem on moral conflicts within a single moral code (Section 3.2) relies on the following lemmas about F-dominance:
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 1(iv).
Lemma 3 Let M(= S, I
) be a consequentialist model. Let
Hence, by our assumption, it holds that Utility(F, w) ≥ Utility(F, w ′ ).
Semantics
Having defined the notions of a consequentialist model, of G-choice equivalence, and of F-dominance, we now give the semantical rules stipulating the conditions under which a formula φ from L is true in a world w in a consequentialist model M. Next, we list some standard deontic formulas that are true according to this semantics. As usual, [[φ] ] M refers to the set of possible worlds in M that validate φ.
Semantical rules and tautologies
Definition 6 (Semantical Rules) Let M(= S, I ) be a consequentialist model. Let w ∈ W and let φ, ψ ∈ L. Then
For the purpose of practicality, we introduce the following notational conventions: Given a model M, we write M |= φ, if for all worlds w in W it holds that M, w |= φ. We write |= φ, if for all models M it holds that M |= φ. Given a choice structure S, we write S |= φ, if for all interpretations I of S it holds that S, I |= φ.
Proof. The proofs of (i) through (iv) are straightforward. The proof of (v) is analogous to the one in (Horty 2001, pp. 166-167) .
An example: the Prisoner's Dilemma
We now fulfill the promise made in the introduction and illustrate our consequentialist semantics for multi-agent deontic logic with an analysis of the Prisoner's Dilemma. The Prisoner's Dilemma is a two-player strategic game, represented by the following payoff matrix (Osborne & Rubinstein 1994, p. This payoff matrix can be translated into a consequentialist model M(= S, I ), where we interpret game theoretic utilities as normalized individual utilities. The choice structure S is given by W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 }, A = {a, b}, Choice(a) = {{w 1 , w 2 }, {w 3 , w 4 }}, and Choice(b) = {{w 1 , w 3 }, {w 2 , w 4 }}. The interpretation I is given by Utility(a, w 1 ) = 3 Utility(b, w 1 ) = 3 Utility(a, w 2 ) = 0 Utility(b, w 2 ) = 4 Utility(a, w 3 ) = 4
Utility(b, w 3 ) = 0 Utility(a, w 4 ) = 1 Utility(b, w 4 ) = 1, and V (p, w) = TRUE if and only if w ∈ {w 3 , w 4 }, and V (q, w) = TRUE if and only if w ∈ {w 2 , w 4 }. We read p as 'Agent a confesses' and q as 'Agent b confesses'.
In this model M, each individual agent faces a basic moral conflict. Both statements 'In the interest of agent a, agent a ought to see to it that p' and 'In the interest of the group of agents consisting of a and b, agent a ought to see to it that ¬p' are true in M. The situation for b is analogous. Hence, M gives rise to two single-agent basic moral conflicts:
Let us see why this follows from our semantics. We show that for all w ∈ W it holds that (i) M, w |= ⊙ a a p and
Hence, we only need to check {w 3 , w 4 } ≻ a a {w 1 , w 2 }. Notice that {w 3 , w 4 } ≻ a a {w 1 , w 2 } if and only if {w 3 , w 4 } a a {w 1 , w 2 } and {w 1 , w 2 } a a {w 3 , w 4 }. The first conjunct holds if and only if for all S ∈ Choice(b) and for all w, w ′ ∈ W it holds that if w ∈ {w 3 , w 4 } ∩ S and w ′ ∈ {w 1 , w 2 } ∩ S, then Utility(a, w) ≥ Utility(a, w ′ ). By definition of M, it holds that Choice(b) = {{w 1 , w 3 }, {w 2 , w 4 }} and Utility(a, w 3 ) ≥ Utility(a, w 1 ) and Utility(a, w 4 ) ≥ Utility(a, w 2 ). Hence, the first conjunct holds. The second conjunct holds if and only if there is an S ∈ Choice(b) and there are w, w ′ ∈ W such that w ∈ {w 1 , w 2 } ∩ S and w ′ ∈ {w 3 , w 4 } ∩ S and Utility(a, w) < Utility(a, w ′ ). Any S ∈ Choice(b) suffices. Hence, the second conjunct holds.
Ad (ii). M, w |= ⊙ a,b a ¬p can be shown analogously. Note that Utility({a, b}, w 1 ) ≥ Utility({a, b}, w 3 ) and Utility({a, b}, w 2 ) ≥ Utility({a, b}, w 4 ). 13 Two additional remarks are in order. First, both statements 'In the interest of the group of agents consisting of a and b, the group of agents consisting of a and b ought to see to it that ¬p' and 'In the interest of the group of agents consisting of a and b, the group of agents consisting of a and b ought to see to it that ¬q' are true in M. Hence, M gives rise to two multi-agent basic moral conflicts:
Second, notice that the agent a cannot see to it that agent b confesses and that the agent b cannot see to it that agent a confesses. Accordingly, both statements 13 Observe that our analysis is sensitive to a theory of group utility. If we had defined group utility in terms of, for example, Amartya Sen's leximin rule which maximizes the utility of the worst-off individual (Sen 1970, p. 138) , rather than via Harsanyi's arithmetical mean, we would obtain neither M |= ⊙ 'In the interest of the group of agents consisting of a and b, agent a ought to see to it that ¬p ∧ ¬q' and 'In the interest of the group of agents consisting of a and b, agent b ought to see to it that ¬p ∧ ¬q' are false in M. Hence, it holds that
In sum, our consequentialist semantics for multi-agent deontic logic provides a formal and fairly accurate account of some important senses of "moral obligation" in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Our logic does not, of course, solve the Prisoner's Dilemma, since it does not prescribe individual agents a and b to further the interest of the group {a, b} rather than to advance their individual interest, nor the other way round.
Three Characterizations of Moral Conflicts
Let us now address the problem of basic moral conflicts from a metalogical viewpoint. We take up Johan van Benthem's notion of a modal formula characterizing a frame property and adapt it to the present situation. 14 By proving that certain deontic formulas characterize certain properties of choice structures, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for (1) the possibility that a single group of agents faces a basic moral conflict, for (2) the possibility that two groups of agents face a basic moral conflict within a single moral code, and for (3) the possibility that two groups of agents face a basic moral conflict.
Definition 7 (Characterization) Let C a class of choice structures and let φ ∈ L. Then φ characterizes C, if for all choice structures S it holds that S ∈ C if and only if S |= φ.
Moral Conflicts of Type
We show that a moral conflict of type ⊙
G ¬p might occur in a choice structure S if and only if there are groups F 1 , F 2 , G of agents in S such that F 1 is non-empty, F 2 is non-empty, F 1 and F 2 are not identical, and G has at least two non-identical options for acting:
Theorem 1 Let C be the class of choice structures S such that for all
14 See (van Benthem 1984) and (Blackburn, de Rijke, & Venema 2001, p. 126) .
Proof. We show that (i) for all S ∈ C it holds that S |= F 1 ,F 2 ,G⊆A ¬(⊙
Then there is an interpretation I of S such that the model M = S, I falsifies 
[Case 2]. Suppose F 2 = ∅. Analogous to Case 1.
[Case 3]. Suppose
Ad (ii). Suppose S ∈ C. Then there must be F 1 , F 2 , G ⊆ A such that F 1 = ∅ and F 2 = ∅ and F 1 = F 2 and Choice(G) = {W }. To prove that
G ¬p), it suffices to construct a model M = S, I in which there is a w such that M, w |= ⊙
G ¬p. Without loss of generality, we may conclude from the four properties that there is an agent a with a ∈ F 1 , there is an agent b with b ∈ F 1 and b ∈ F 2 , and there are at least two nonidentical options K 1 and K 2 in Choice(G). We now define a suitable interpretation I = Utility, V . First, Utility is defined as follows:
and for all agents c in A − {a, b} and for all worlds w in W , we fix Utility(c, w) = 0. Second, we stipulate that V (p, w) = TRUE if and only if w ∈ K 1 . Let M = S, I and let w ∈ W . Now it is easy to show that (1) for all
Some authors have claimed that axiological approaches to moral obligations leave no room for moral conflicts. 15 A common argument for this claim runs as follows: "For suppose that A and B are incompatible. Then if it ought to be the case that A, higher values attach to some outcomes satisfying A than to any satisfying not A. But, because of the assumed incompatibility, all outcomes that satisfy B satisfy not A. Hence it is better to opt for A than for B. So, whenever A and B are mutually incompatible, it cannot be that both ought to be the case" (van Fraassen 1973, p. 8) .
Things are different in our consequentialist multi-agent deontic logic.
We show that a moral conflict of type ⊙ F
¬p might occur in a choice structure S if and only if there are groups F, G 1 , G 2 of agents in S such that F is non-empty, G 1 − G 2 has at least two non-identical options for acting, G 2 − G 1 has at least two non-identical options for acting, and G 1 ∩G 2 has at least two non-identical options for acting. 16 Since there is only one interest group involved, the theorem also applies to Horty's original system. Note also that the proof is independent from our definition of group utility as the mean of the individual utilities concerned.
Theorem 2 Let C ′ be the class of choice structures S such that for all
Proof. We show that (i) for all S ∈ C ′ it holds that S |= F ,
Then there is an interpretation I of S such that the model M = S, I falsifies
¬p, it must be that M, w |= p and M, w |= ¬p. Contradiction.
[Case 2]. Suppose Choice(G 1 −G 2 ) = {W }. Then, by Lemma 1(iii), it must be that Choice(
and let w ∈ W . Now it is easy to show that (1) for all R ∈ Choice(G 1 ) with
Let us take a closer look at the countermodel of part (ii) to interpret it properly. The group G 1 ∩ G 2 of agents cannot make a principled choice from Choice(G 1 ∩ G 2 ) to maximize the interest of group F. If G 1 ∩ G 2 is taken to belong to group G 1 , it has to choose option M 2 to maximize F's interest. On the other hand, if G 1 ∩ G 2 is seen as a subgroup of group G 2 , it must rather choose option M 1 to maximize F's interest. Obviously, G 1 ∩ G 2 cannot choose both options. The group G 1 ∩ G 2 of agents is wearing two hats here.
Earl Conee contends that in cases "where competing moral considerations have exactly the same force (..) [w] e have the familiar option of holding that (..) each act is permitted and none is absolutely obligatory" (Conee 1982, p. 92) . Unfortunately, this advice does not free G 1 ∩ G 2 from its precarious predicament. In our example, only two of G 1 ∩ G 2 's possible courses of action maximize F-utility. Clearly, in order to maximize F-utility, G 1 ∩ G 2 must perform one of these two F-maximizing options. Conee's recommendation just to waive the obligatory character of both F-maximizing options simply does not wash. The existence of a moral conflict does not relieve G 1 ∩ G 2 of the obligation to do the best it can. 17 Hence, an additional decision procedure must be invoked to enforce a unique F-maximizing course of action. Ruth B. Marcus suggests that "[i]n the unlikely cases where in fact two conflicting courses of action have the same utility, it is open to the act utilitarian to adopt a procedure for deciding, such as tossing a coin" (Marcus 1980, p. 126) . If G 1 ∩ G 2 consists of a single individual agent and if this single agent has identified the F-maximizing options, Marcus's suggestion would indeed save Buridan's ass from starvation. Does it also solve the decision problem if G 1 ∩ G 2 consists of two (or more) individual agents?
In his simile of the soul as a chariot driven by reason and pulled by two horses embodying the spirited and the appetitive element, Plato notes that "the task of our charioteer is difficult and troublesome". 18 If G 1 ∩ G 2 consists of two (or more) individual agents, the situation is even worse: a team of Buridan's asses has to coordinate its actions even without the whip of reason. Such a co-ordinated collective action entails at least the following four steps. First, the agents in G 1 ∩ G 2 must collectively identify the F-maximizing options in Choice(G 1 ∩ G 2 ). Second, they have to agree upon which F-maximizing option M in Choice(G 1 ∩ G 2 ) is going to be realized. (Here, they might indeed agree to flip a coin.) Third, each agent a in G 1 ∩ G 2 must identify the unique option in Choice(a) required for realizing M . Fourth, each agent a in G 1 ∩ G 2 has to perform this unique course of action. Obviously, at each step a slip is easily made.
To conclude, we show that a moral conflict of type ⊙
¬p might occur in a choice structure S if and only if there are groups F 1 , F 2 , G 1 , G 2 of agents in S such that F 1 is non-empty, F 2 is non-empty, G 1 ∩ G 2 has at least two non-identical options for acting, and, finally, if F 1 and F 2 are identical, then both G 1 − G 2 and G 2 − G 1 have at least two non-identical options for acting:
Theorem 3 Let C ′′ be the class of choice structures S such that for all F 1 , F 2 , G 1 , G 2 ⊆ A it holds that F 1 = ∅ or F 2 = ∅ or Choice(G 1 ∩ G 2 ) = {W } or (F 1 = F 2 and Choice(G 1 − G 2 ) = {W }) or (F 1 = F 2 and Choice(G 2 − G 1 ) = {W }). Let p ∈ P. Then
Proof. Use the proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
Conclusion
In the present paper, we studied three different types of moral conflicts. On such conflicts we proved three theorems, the third of which is a generalization of the other two. Theorem 1 implies that if a single group of agents faces a moral conflict, this group must have obligations with respect to different non-empty interest groups. Hence, such a single-group moral conflict includes at least two agents. From Theorem 2 it follows that if two groups of agents face a moral conflict within a single moral code, then there must be at least three agents involved. Apparently, some deontological properties which are central to meta-ethics can only emerge in multi-agent settings, thereby establishing, or so it seems, multi-agent deontic logic as a proper field of study. 19
